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Just as the weakest link in a chain determines the
strength of the entire chain, so does the worst-performservice detering component of a telecommunications
1
mine the quality of that service.

It would be hard to get through the day without
hearing about the revolution occurring in the
world of telecommunications. Possibly the area
where changes are most expected is the local telephone service arena ("local exchange"). While
statutory and regulatory precedent have ruled
that the era of a monopolized local exchange is
dead, reality proves otherwise.
Following the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 19962 ("1996 Act"), which
sought to expand competition in the telecommu-

nications industry, no issue proved as surprisingly
important to the development of local competition as operations support systems ("OSS").3
OSS are computer database systems used by
communications service providers to store and
provide information related to customer subscription, maintenance and repair, billing, service requests, and many other services. 4 OSS were not
originally designed to be accessible via interconnection 5 by competitors 6 to an incumbent local
exchange carrier 7 ("ILEC"). Instead, they were
created for the ILEC's own internal use. The 1996
Act alters the way ILECs employ OSS by requiring
them to provide competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") 8 nondiscriminatory access to their
OSS. 9
CLECs depend on OSS access for the same cus-

1 Teleport Communications Group, Model Performance
Parity Measures for Facilities-Based Competition Introduction (visited Feb. 20, 1998), <http://www.tcg.com/tcg/regulate/
whitePaper/mppm.html> [hereinafter Teleport Comm. Group].
2 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
3
See Tim Wilson, OSS Unbundling Issue Hampers RBOCs,
COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, Aug. 4,1997, at T17. Problems with
accessing OSS are causing concern among many communications service providers seeking to compete in the local exchange market.
4 See Petition for Expedited Rulemaking of the LCI Int'l
Telecom Corp. and Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n, RM 9109,
Prt No DA97-1211 at 1 (May 30, 1997) [hereinafter LCI
CompTel Petition]. An incumbent local exchange carrier's
("ILEC") OSS are key elements that provide vital service
functions, including: pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning,
maintenance, repair, billing, traffic data, real-time network
control, and forecasting of customer needs.
5
See GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, GLOSSARY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TERMS 1-9 (1997). Interconnection is the connection between two telecommunications carriers' networks, or
the connection of telephone equipment to the telephone
network. Id. [hereinafter GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES]
6 See IEC Web Proforums, The OperationalSupport System
Tutorial: TraditionalSystems, § 2 (visitedJan. 19, 1998) <http:/
[here/www.webproforum.com/manchester/topic02.html>

inafter IEC Web Proforums].
7 See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, ET AL., Federal Telecommunications Law, 858 (1992) [hereinafter KELLOGG]. Incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") refers to carriers who served as
providers of local exchange services, including BOCs and independent telecommunications carriers. Id. See also LCI
CompTel Petition, 1. Applied herein, ILEC refers to any local exchange carrier subject to the obligations of 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 (c), which imposes on ILECs the duty to negotiate with
competitors, permit network interconnection, provide access
to unbundled network elements, offer resale, notify interconnecting carriers of changes in network configurations, and
provide for physical or virtual collocation of equipment. Id.
Not included in the definition of ILEC are those ILECs with
less than 2% of subscriber lines who have received an exemption, suspension, or modification of § 251(c) pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 251(f). Id.
8 See NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 151 (13th Ed.
1998). Competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC") refers
to communications service providers who seek to compete on
a selective basis for local exchange service, long distance, Internet, and various other entertainment services. Id. CLECs
are likely to lease and resell local loops from the ILEC at
wholesale rates. Id.
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1996). See also 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c)(4) (1996).
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tomer service and network management reasons
that ILECs do. 10 However, this dependence is accentuated by CLECs' entry into the recently deregulated local exchange. As a result, many lack
the time and financial resources necessary to construct a facilities-based communications network.
Unable to wait to begin before providing local exchange services, CLECs interconnect with the
ILEC's network and obtain access to its OSS. Unfortunately, CLECs' capacities to access an ILEC's
OSS have encountered impenetrable barriers
which further hamper local competition. " Ironically, these barriers also prevent regional Bell Operating Companies' 2 ("RBOCs") from obtaining
authority to provide in-region, interLATA services. '3
Two years after the passage of the 1996 Act, legislators, 14 regulators, carriers, and other interested parties have become preoccupied with the
lack of effective competition in the local exchange.1 5 Such concerns appear well-founded
given the unlikelihood that local competition will
materialize if OSS remains to be subject to "delay,
6
dilution, and degradation of access."'
This Comment proposes that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") adopt a set of
rules governing CLEC access to OSS. First, the
FCC should require ILECs to measure all pertinent OSS services. Second, the FCC should establish a set of default performance benchmarks.
Third, the FCC must impose on ILECs monthly
reporting requirements. Lastly, the FCC must impose penalties on those ILECs that fail to provide
nondiscriminatory access to OSS.
Part I of this Comment looks at the problems
See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 3-4.
See Carolyn Hirschman, Long in Coming: Issues Remain
Unresolved as Telecom Act's Second Anniversary Nears, TELEPHONY, Jan. 12, 1998, at 52 [hereinafter Hirschman, Long in
Coming]. Competition in the local exchange market is progressing, albeit slowly. However, success depends on resolving serious problems, one of which is that "operations sup1o
11

port systems still have many bugs." Id.
12

See 47 U.S.C. § 153(4) (West Supp. 1998).

13

See id. at § 271. To date no BOC has obtained author-

ity to provide in-region, interLATA services pursuant to 47

U.S.C. § 271. . However, on December 31, 1997, a Federal
District CourtJudge in Texas held Section 271 to be unconstitutional. Similarly, Senator McCain recently introduced
legislation in the form of Senate Bill 1766, which seeks to
repeal Section 271.
14

See Congress on Competition, TELECOMPETITION

REPORT,

Feb. 26, 1998, at 3. Ten Members of the House of Representatives submitted statements in the Congressional Record supporting BOCs and blaming the FCC and CLECs for the lack
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experienced by ILECs and CLECs in obtaining
nondiscriminatory OSS access. Part II justifies the
FCC's authority to regulate OSS. Part III analyzes
and recommends performance measurement
standards. Part IV recommends a reporting requirement policy for the FCC to follow. Part V
recommends a method by which the FCC ought
to impose monetary and injunctive penalties for
not adhering to OSS access requirements.
I.

THE NEED TO GUARANTEE PARITY

A.

History of OSS

Telephone companies once employed large
staffs and kept warehouses of paper records to
monitor how telephone services were ordered,
provided, maintained and repaired.1 7 In the
1970s and 1980s specialized computer systems, referred to as operations support systems, were introduced to automate those functions and reduce
labor costs.1 8

The history of telecommunications leading up
to the passage of the 1996 Act is characterized by
the monopolization of the local exchange by a
sole service provider which was not required to
open its network to interconnection.' 9 As a result, OSS were designed specifically for an ILEC's
sole use. 20 Over time technological developments
led to improvements in OSS. However, the lack
of OSS technological standards meant that ILECs
were free to choose whether or not to install upgrades. 2 1 As a result, countless OSS systems have
been developed that are both ILEC-and-servicespecific, and not universally implemented by
of competition in the local exchange market. Id.
15
See Hirschman, Long in Coming, supra note 11, at 52.
16 See Comments of Association for Local Telecommunications Services ("ALTS") to the LCI Comptel Petition, RM
9109, at ii (July 10, 1997). [hereinafter Comments of ALTS].
17
See AT&T Public Policy, OSS Interfaces and Competitive
Local Telephone Service, (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://
www.att.com/publicpolicy/oss.html>.
18

See id.

See generally KELLOGG, supra note 7, at § 1.1. Prior to
the 1986 Modified Final judgment ("MFJ"), both local and
19

long distance markets were monopolized by the Bell System.
Id. at § 1.7. The MFJ divested AT&T from Bell so that it may
provide long distance services. Id. MFJ then created seven
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOC" or "BOC")
from the old Bell System to serve as defacto monopoly local
service providers. Id.
20
See IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6.
21

See id. at § 3.
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ILECs nationwide.2 2 As the new entrants in the
local exchange, CLECs face the challenge of in-

terconnecting with the countless, complex OSSs
23
employed by ILECs nationwide.
B.

ble through interconnection. In the Local Compe-

Enter Local Competition

The 1996 Act intended to open the local exchange to competition. 24 Understanding that local networks are not built overnight, Congress allowed CLECs to interconnect with an ILEC's
network to provide services. Section 251 of the
1996 Act imposes interconnection requirements
on all local exchange carriers. 25 Section 251 (c),
however, imposes specific interconnection requirements on ILECs. 26 Section 251(c) (3) requires that ILECs provide CLECs nondiscriminatory access 27 to their network elements on an

basis. 28

unbundled
Unbundled network elements
("UNEs") may then be combined together with
either the ILEC's other services, or a CLEC's own
network elements.
Congress recognized that not all carriers would
have the equipment or capital to provide local
services via their own network facilities. 29 It therefore designated resale as the other method that
CLECs may employ to enter the local service. Section 251(c) (4)30 requires ILECs to make their

services available to CLECs for resale purposes.3 1
Following the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC
22
See In re Common CarrierBureau Operations Support Systems Forum, 40 (1997). ILECs have developed OSS systems
that fail to work with CLECs' systems, but work well for its
own uses. Id.
23
See id. ILEC's proprietary interfaces are barriers to entry which raise costs and hinder efficiency. Id. Such interfaces also require a CLEC to develop multiple OSS computer
interfaces for different ILECs, and force them to develop the
capacity to alternate between those different interfaces. Id.
24
See Hirschman, Long in Coming, supra note 11, at 52.
25
See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1996).
26
See id. § 251(c).
27
See id. § 251(c)(3). Non discriminatory access to an
ILEC's network is often referred to as "parity." Parity infers
that the ILEC provides to the CLEC the same quality of access to network elements and services that it provides itself.
28
See GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, supra note 5, at U-1
(1997). Unbundling is the separation of communications
services that are associated with a larger service, i.e. unbundling operator and emergency services from the larger
local services package. Id.
29
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 117 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 128.
30
See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(4) (1996).

31

See NEWFON's

TELECOM DICIONARY,

embarked on filling in the details. Most importantly, the FCC promulgated the Local Competition
Order which interpreted Section 251's interconnection requirements to infer that OSS is one of
an ILEC's network elements to be made accessi-

supra note 5, at R-

18. Owners of communications networks do not utilize all
the network's capacity. Id. Unused portions of the network

tition Order,the FCC subsequently listed those OSS
services that an ILEC must make available: specifically, information about "pre-ordering, ordering,
provisioning, maintenance and repair, and bill32

ing."

C.

The Services
Pre-ordering is a multi-step process

33

during

which a CLEC accesses a customer service record
("CSR") that details the name and address of an
ILEC's customer. 34 The CSR also contains infor-

mation regarding specific services to which the
customer currently subscribes, and which additional services the end-user has not chosen to receive. This allows the CLEC to determine its marketing strategy so that it may convince a potential
customer that it can offer a better array of services
35
at a better value.
A CLEC's pre-ordering success depends on two
factors. First, given that pre-ordering occurs while
the potential customer is on the line with the
CLEC's sales representative, the CLEC must be
able to access the CSR on a real-time basis. 36 Secare offered to other carriers who purchase communications
services from the network's owner which are then resold to
additional customers. Id.
32
See In, re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996 and Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
15754, para. 518 (1996).
33
Id. See also In re Application of Ameritech Michigan
Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in the State of
Michigan, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice, at A-5 (June 25,
1997) [hereinafter Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of Ameritech MI].
"Ameritech provides five ...
pre-ordering functions: customer service record retrieval; telephone number selection
and reservation; due date selection and reservation; address
validation; and feature availability." Id. Together, the services provide CLECs with the functionality to provide basic
services to end-users. Id.
34 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 9. Customer Service Record ("CSR") refers to profiles of specific
customers that detail "name, billing and service addresses,
billed telephone numbers, and identification of features and
services on subscriber accounts." Id.
35
See id.at 6.,
36
See In. re Application of SBC Communications Inc. et
al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act
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ond, the CSR must be thoroughly accurate and
up-to-date.3 7 Otherwise, initiating and maintaining communications is hindered by a lack of access to accurate information which results in the
competitor not appearing as efficient as the
38
ILEC.
Once the end-user agrees to change carriers,
the CLEC requests (i.e. "orders") the ILEC to
place the customer's service account in its
name. 39 The CLEC at this time also orders any
new services to be added to the customer's current batch of services, and requests and obtains a
date for service initialization. 40 Ordering is provided via two distinct methods: manual and computer interface.

41

While the problems of these

two methods also occur with pre-ordering, maintenance, and repair, their effects are felt the most
during the ordering process.
Manual processing is least favored. 42 Once preordering is complete, a CLEC normally transmits
via facsimile its order to the ILEC so that it may
enter the information into the OSS database.
of 1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in the State
of Oklahoma, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Friduss Aff. at
10-11 (May 16, 1997). [hereinafter Dept. ofJustice Evaluation
of SBC Communications OK].
37 See id.
38
See id. Pre-ordering is especially important given that
it is the first encounter between the CLEC and customer. Id.
39 See id. at 11. Ordering may also include database updates pertaining to 911, directory listings, and repair, switch
updates, and dispatch of a technician. Id.
40
See id.
41
See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Application of Ameritech MI, supra note 33 at A-9. Some orders received via automated interfaces are either reviewed or edited manually
prior to being processed by Ameritech's OSS. Id.
42
See id. at A-15 (stating that manual processing is the
weakest link in the chain of processing orders). Id.
43 See id. at A-16-A-17.
44 See id. at A-5.
45, See id.at A-18. "[D]elays leave CLECs in limbo vis-a-vis
their (potential) customers for significant periods of time,
whereas Ameritech retail representatives receive comparable
notifications of order errors almost immediately." Id.
46
See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, 36, (1997). See also Problems With OSS Interfaces Again Stymie BellSouth in Efforts to Provide In-region InterlATA Services, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Feb. 9,1998,
at I [hereinafter Problems With OSS Interfaces]. The FCC determined that BellSouth failed to provide CLECs information
regarding the status of their order that was substantially
equivalent to what it provided itself. Id.
47 See In re Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant
to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, As
Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 Communications Reg.
(P&F) 267, 327 (1997) [hereinafter Application of Ameritech
MI]. Ameritech was incapable of processing all of a CLEC's
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Once the relevant data is entered, the ILEC then
returns a form order confirmation ("FOC") to the
CLEC indicating that the service order was completed. 43 Manual OSS is fraught with problems,
including: lack of commitment by ILECs to match
its own human resources staffing needs with
CLEC increased order volume; 44 time to communicate orders; 45 lost orders; processing time; and
human error.4 6 These problems are further compounded as more orders are received, eventually
creating a vicious cycle 47 that, in the end, has negative repercussions on the CLEC's ability to convince end-users that it can provide high quality local services.

48

OSS access through an ILEC's computerized in49
terfaces is the preferred ordering method.
Computerized OSS involves two separate computer interfaces, one between the ILEC and
CLEC, 50 and another between the first interface

and the ILEC's OSS.51
Once established, the computerized interface
must be able to comply with the nondiscriminaorders in a timely manner because the

"...

increased order

volume triggered a simultaneous increase in the number of
orders requiring manual processing, which severely strained
Ameritech's available resources. Because Ameritech lacked
the resources to handle this increase, orders were backlogged, delaying Ameritech's ability to deliver FOCs and order
rejection notices, and requiring Ameritech to modify the due
dates for those orders it was unable to process within the
time-frame defined by the requested due date." Id.
48
See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, at 88-89. LCI terminated its initial local services marketing campaign due to countless ordering problems
with its ILEC. LCI believed that continuing its local services
efforts with such obstacles would have a significant negative
effect on its reputation as a long distance carrier. Id.
49 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Ameritech MI, supra
note 33, at A-2. Computerized OSS interfaces provide the
advantage of processing speed, storage information density,
and accuracy. Id.
5
See id. See also In re Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth
Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA
Services in South Carolina, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice at
A-5 (Nov. 4, 1997). [hereinafter Application of BellSouth]
BOCs will need to automate the interaction of the interfaces
with their OSS as it will be "critical to the meaningful availability of resale services and unbundled elements." Id.
5'
See Application of BellSouth, supra note 50, at A-4. The
term "flow through" describes the process in which an order
passes through the computer interface without any glitches
or rejections. See also Problems With OSS Interfaces, supra note
46, at 1. The FCC rejected the 271 application partially because 97% and 81% of BellSouth's residential and business
orders, respectively, flow through its own OSS databases,
while only 40% of CLEC's customer orders flowed through
in August 1997 and 54% in September. Id.
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tory access standards of Sections 251 and 271 of

troubles.

64

the 1996 Act. 52 However, carriers understand that

problems will accompany the implementation of
an automated OSS. 53 CLECs need not tolerate
the following problems which are representative
of the ills currently affecting local competition: in55
terface incompatibility; 54 late record reporting;
interfaces not being ready to support OSS requests; 5 6 high rejection rates due to universal service

ordering

codes

("USOCs");

57

poor flow

through rates; 58 and, lengthy ordering time intervals.

59

The CLEC must be able to bill its customer in a
timely and accurate manner. 6 0 To do so, the
ILEC must first deliver billing records to the
CLEC who then conveys its own bill to the customer. The ILEC's billing records must be accurate so that the CLEC can correct potential conflicts without adversely affecting customer service.
Billing errors are especially troublesome given
their effect on an end-user's perception of CLEC
service quality. Double billing is likely to result
where an ILEC does not update its OSS to indicate that a specific end-user changed carriers. 61
Late or missed billing periods may also occur, especially where an ILEC sends inaccurate billing
records to the CLEC, the errors are corrected,
62
and then the end-user is billed.

The CLEC depends on the ILEC to monitor
services to determine if the services are operational and, where they are not, to repair them in a
timely fashion. 6 3 Other maintenance and repair
issues include the amount of time an ILEC requires to make repairs and the frequency of such
52
See also Problems With OSS Interfaces, supra note 46, at 1.
BOCs are obligated to provide automated communications
for OSSs and ensure that they are analogous to the BOC's
retail operations. Id.
53
See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, at 78. OSS may appear perfect on the drawing board but it is a guarantee that problems will ensue. Id.
But see id. at 119. CLECs are accepting automated systems'
imperfections "because the manual processing is not an acceptable alternative." Id.
54
See LCI ConpTel Petition, supra note 4, at 34.
55
See id. at 36.
56
See id. at 37.
57
See infra note 211. Generally, USOCs are the codes
used by an ILEC to identify services and features. The codes
subsequently appear on the customer service records that the
ILEC provides CLECs. Id.
58
See Problems With OSS Interfaces, supra note 46, at 1.
59

See, Comments of WinStar Communications, Inc., ")

to the LCI Comptel Petition, RM 9109 at 5 (July 10, 1997).
60

See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 6.

II.

LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR FCC
ACTION ON OSS

A.

FCC Has Congressional Authority to
Promulgate Rules on OSS

According to Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense
Council, Inc., the FCC must have explicit or implied authority from Congress to regulate access
to OSS. 6 5 Based on the analysis detailed below,

the FCC has the requisite authority to require performance measurement standards, reporting requirements and impose penalties.
B.

Title I

Congress delegated to the FCC broad authority
under Section 1 of Title I of the Act to regulate
interstate and foreign communications by wire
and radio. 66 Congress did this to ensure that a

national wire and radio network would make communications services available to all people of the
United States. While communications originating
on the local exchange might appear intrastate in
nature, they often terminate across state boundaries. This fact qualifies the call as interstate, and
thereby falls within the FCC's implied or express
authority under Section

C.

151.67

Section 251
The 1996 Act demonstrates Congress' under-

61 See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of Ameritech M, supra note
33, at n17. Double-billing is the most serious problem related to Ameritech's OSS. Id.
62

See Local Competition Users Group, Service Quality

Measurements, Version 6.1, 13 (Sept. 26, 1997). [hereinafter
LCUG Service Quality Measurements].
63
See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 6.
64
See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62, at

10.
65
See Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron requires a reviewing court
to (1) determine if Congress spoke on the issue of the
rulemaking and if so, (2) to determine whether the rule contradicts Congress' express or implied intent. Id. If Congress
did not authorize the FCC to rule on OSS, the court considers whether the agency's rule is premised on a reasonable
construction of the statute., Id.
66
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

104, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
67

See id.
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standing that local exchange networks are not
built overnight. 6 Until they are, CLECs seeking
to offer telecommunications services may interconnect with an ILEC to resell the ILEC's services
or combine its own services with an ILEC's Unbundled Network Elements ("UNEs"). Section
251 promulgates the rules requiring ILECs to interconnect between CLEC and ILEC via resale' 9
and UNEs.

71

1

Section 251 (c) (3) requires ILECs to provide a
requesting carrier "nondiscriminatory access to
'7 1 It
network elements on an unbundled basis."
further requires that an ILEC provide UNEs "on
rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.

'72

Section 251 (c) (4) imposes on an ILEC the duty
to make its network available for a CLEC to
repackage its services on a resale basis. 73
251(c)(4)(b) also precludes the ILEC from
prohibiting and imposing any "unreasonable or
discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the
resale of telecommunications service[s]." 74 The
FCC determined in the Local Competition Order

that OSS "fall squarely within the definition of
network element." 75 The FCC also ruled that ac-

cess to OSS falls within the scope of indiscriminate access to resale services under 251(c) (4).76
While the Local Competition Order largely was
overruled in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC,7 7 the court

upheld the FCC's interpretation of Section 251 as
it applies to OSS.78 The court specifically noted
that the term "network element ' 79 includes "the

technology and information used to facilitate or68 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket No. 96-98, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, paras. 6-15 (1996)
[hereinafter Local Competition Order].
69

47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c) (4) (West Supp. 1998). "[N]ot to

prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory

conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunications service." Id.
70 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c)(3) (West Supp. 1998). Stating
that there is a "[d]uty to provide nondiscriminatory access to
network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically
feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." Id.
71

/d.

72
73
74
75

Id.

See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c)(4) (West Supp. 1998).
See id. § 251 (c) (4) (b).
Local Competition Order, supra note 68, at 15763.
Id. "We conclude that, under any of these interpreta76
tions, operations support systems functions are subject to the
nondiscriminatory access duty imposed by section 251 (c) (3),
and the duty imposed by section 251 (c) (4) to provide resale
services under just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms
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dering, billing, and maintenance of phone service
- the functions of operational support systems."8 0
The court also supported the FCC's interpretation of the definition of "unbundled element."8 1
The court found that "information sufficient for
billing and collection" related to the "features,
functions, and capabilities" which are used in the
commercial offering of telecommunications services to the public by computer software and hardware that includes OSS.82
Section 271

D.

The 1996 Act conditions Bell Operating Company (BOC) entry into interLATA on compliance
with Section 271 of the Act.8 3

There are two

methods of gaining 271 authority: 271(c) (1) (A)
and 271(c)(1)(B). Subsection (A) requires the
BOC to prove that it had not received any requests for interconnection within three months
prior to requesting 271 authority.8 4 So far, the
FCC has yet to review an Section 271 application
under this option.
271(c)(1)(B) is the rule under which most
BOCs apply for 271 authority. A BOC must
demonstrate its compliance with the section's 14
point checklist to prove that it faces irreversible,
85
facilities-based competition in its region.
The following requirements taken from the
Section 271 checklist provide further proof that
the FCC retains authority over OSS. Section
271(c) (1) (B) (i) requires BOC compliance with
86
Section 251's interconnection requirements.
and conditions." Id.
77

See generally Iowa Ulil. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.

1997).
78
79

See id. 120 F.3d at 808.

47 U.S.C.A. § 153(29) (West Supp. 1998). A 'network

element' is a "facility or equipment used in the provision of a
telecommunications service." Id. The term also includes
"features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by
means of such facility or equipment, including subscriber
numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection." Id.
Iowa Util. Bd., at 808.
See id. at 809.
See id.
82
8-3 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1998).
See In re the Application of BellSouth Corporation, et.
84
al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications act of
1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services
in South Carolina, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC
Rcd. 539, 543 (1997). [hereinafter Application of BellSouth SC
81)
81

85

86

See id.
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (c) (2) (B) (i) (West Supp. 1998).

Regulating Operational Support Systems

1998]

Section 271(c) (1) (B) (ii) requires provision of
nondiscriminatory access to network elements according

to Section

251(c)(3).8

7

Section

271(c) (1) (B) (xiv) requires proof of indiscriminate access to resale facilities, which thereby requires access to OSS. Lastly, as indicated immediately below, the FCC has authority subsequent to
Section 271 (d) (6) to penalize BOCs via fines and
injunctive relief for not complying with both 251
and 271 obligations.
Prior to providing in-region interLATA service,
a BOC must demonstrate its compliance with the
relevant state public utilities commission
("PUC"), Department of Justice, and FCC. Both
the PUC and Department of Justice then issue reports which the FCC may consider, but need not
depend, in writing its final order. 88 In conclusion, the FCC's 271 jurisdictional obligations indicate that it retains authority to require compliance with default performance measurements,
reporting requirements, and impose penalties for
not providing parity to OSS.

E.

FCC Authority to Penalize for Lack of
Compliance

The FCC retains jurisdiction throughout the
Act to penalize ILECs who do not comply with
their obligation to provide access to OSS on nondiscriminatory, equal basis. Generally speaking,
the FCC may invoke Section 205 to issue a "cease
and desist" order against ILECs for violating the
interconnection requirements in Sections 251
and 271.89 Section 205 further permits the FCC
to levy a fine of $12,000 for each of those offense. 90 For reasons set out in Section V of this
Comment, this option is not deemed to be the
most effective measure, as an ILEC with considerable market power is likely to consider the fine to

As noted above, FCC retains jurisdiction over interconnection between carriers for resale services and UNEs as re-

quired by Section 251. See supra notes 69-82.
87
See id. § 271(c) (1) (B) (ii) (1997). As noted above,
under Section 251 OSS is inherently involved in interconnection for UNEs and resale services. Id.
88 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (2) (A) and(B) (West Supp.

1998).
89
90

91

See 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1994).
See id. § 205 (b).
Seeid. §503(b)(1)(A).

be the cost of doing business. For example, how
much negative financial impact can a $12,000 fine
have on a carrier who is eroding another's market
statute; even if it is via unsavory tactics?
The FCC may also invoke Title V to levy more
stringent fines against ILECs if the FCC determines after notice and a hearing that an ILEC
willfully or repeatedly violated the terms of its li92
censing authority, 9 1 or any provisions of the Act.
As a result the FCC may impose fines up to
$100,000 for each violation. However, the fine for
a continuing violation may not exceed
$1,000,000. 93

Where BOCs are hindering a CLEC's 0SS access, it is more likely that the FCC will invoke Section 271 (d) (6) to assess penalties. 94 The FCC
may, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, apply either one of the following two options:
order the deficiency corrected or penalize the offending BOC under Title V; or, suspend or revoke
the BOC's in-region interLATA service author95

ity.

Section 271 (d) (6) emphasizes Congress' concern that BOCs may use their in-region market
power to discriminate against a competitor in providing interconnection access. 271(d)(6) therefore serves as the FCC's stick to maintain order in
the local exchange.
In The Second Order on Reconsideration the FCC
asserted that it did not anticipate the need for any
immediate enforcement action against ILECs who
are making good faith efforts to comply with their
nondiscriminatory access requirement.96 However, the FCC did not preclude the initiation of
FCC enforcement "where circumstances warrant. '97 Clearly, ongoing discriminatory access to

OSS appear to be the circumstances under which
the FCC should establish the framework from
which any enforcement ought to take place.

See id. § 503(b)(1)(B).
See id.§ 503(b) (2) (B).
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (d) (6) (West Supp. 1998). This
section provides that the FCC has ongoing oversight of a
BOC offering interLATA service. Id.
95 See id. § 271 (d)(6)(A).
96
See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 19738, 19744 (1996).
97 [d.
92

93
94
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III.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

STANDARDS
A.

Pros & Cons of Performance Measurement
Standards

There is an old Bell system saying: "if you can
measure it, you can manage it."98 CLECs, 99
PUCs, 10 0 Department of Justice, 10 1 and the
FCC 1112 all have asserted the importance of performance measurement requirements. Given that
the FCC has yet to grant a BOC Section 271 licensing authority, 0 3 it would appear that they too
would recognize the role that performance measurement standards would play in demonstrating
compliance with Section 271.104
ILECs, however, do not look favorably on federal regulations requiring them to measure access

to OSS. In one sense it would be an additional
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surement standards discriminatory. 10 7
The beneficial value of performance measurement standards outweigh any asserted negative aspects. First, detecting discrimination in complying with OSS access requirements depends on the
establishment of performance measurements. 10 8
Second, in the case of BOCs complying with Section 271 after having received in-region, interLATA authority, measurements quantify
whether the BOC continues to provide nondiscriminatory access.' 0 9 Third, measurements enable CLECs and ILECs to "request, monitor and
implement interconnection."' 11 0 Lastly, measurements enable carriers, regulators and customers
to review and predict industry trends.11 1
B.

Differences Between UNE and Resale

function that their OSS might not be able to handle.10 5 In another, performance measurement

1. Description of the Services

standards would be a redundant regulatory bur-

The Act anticipates three methods through
which local services will be provided: resale, un-

den. 10 6 Some ILECs consider performance mea98 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 1 (July 10,
1997).
99 See Comments of WinStar Comm., Inc., supra note 59,
at 3. "The Commission also should initiate a rulemaking proceeding to set minimum uniform performance standards for
OSS, and impose penalties for failure to meet those standards." Id.
100 See In re Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion into Monitoring Performance of Operations Support Systems, California Public Utilities Commission R.97-10-016, at 6 (Oct. 9,1997) [hereinafter CPUCR.9710-016]. It would be difficult to determine whether Pacific
Bell should be authorized to offer in-region interLATA servOSS are functionices without data to determine whether its
ing properly. Id.
101 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Communications
OK, supra note 36, Friduss Aff. at 6. Detecting discrimination
in provision of OSS services depends on establishing performance measures. Id.
102 See Application of Ameritech MI, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, supra note 47, at 330. The FCC must have a
proper factual basis to determine whether a BOC is supplying nondiscriminatory access to all of its OSS functions. Id.
103 Teleport Comm. Group, supranote 1, at 2-3. Stating that
additional reasons for ILECs is the avoidance of repeated
complaints and subsequent lawsuits. But cf Opposition Comments of GTE Service Corporation Comments to the Request
for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 3-4 (July 10, 1997). (Asserting that ILECs are already subject to performance measurements through interconnection agreements). Id.
104 Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Ameritech MI, supra note
33, at 35. Ameritech admits that it needs "concrete, detailed
performance standards and benchmarks for measuring
Ameritech's compliance with its contractual obligations and
impos[ing] penalties for noncompliance." Id.
105 See Opposition Comments of GTE Service Corp. to
the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 12-13 (July 10,

1997). [hereinafter Opposition Comments of GTE Service
Corp.]. (Explaining that measurement systems do not exist
for services provided to CLECs since there was no need to
provide them in the past). Id. But see Teleport Comm. Group,
supra note 1, at 2. Asserting that ILECs monitor their own
performance in critical areas, PUCs require ILECs to submit
service quality data in regular reports, and the FCC requires
BOCs and other ILECs to file performance measurements
for its annual report, "Quality of Service for Local Operating
Companies Aggregated to the Holding Company Level." Id.
106
See Opposition Comments of GTE Service Corp.,
supra note 105, at 13. See also Comments of Bell Atlantic and
Nynex to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 5
(July 10, 1997) (noting that interconnection agreements between parties, which are mediated and arbitrated by PUCs,
contain rigorous performance measurement standards). Id.
107
See Comments of Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. to the Request for Comments in DA
No. 97-1211, at 9-10 (July 10, 1997). ILECs may not be able
to meet the standards for the services that they provide for
their own use. Also, the standards will not likely permit exceptions for lapses caused by "natural disasters, work stoppages, periods of great demand, or weekends or holidays,"
and because resources are finite. Id.
108 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Communications
OK, supra note 36, Friduss Aff. at 7.
109 See In re Application by BellSouth Corp., BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc. and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice, at 38 (Dec. 10, 1997). [hereinafter
Dept. ofJustice Eval. of BellSouth LA].
I10 Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 4. Performance measurement standards enable carriers to determine if
they are receiving nondiscriminatory access, and if so, to continue conducting business with the ILEC with whom they interconnect.
M

Id.at3.
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bundled network elements, and construction of

2.

Recommendation

one's own network. 112 Unless one CLEC is pro-

viding interconnection to another CLEC, the
third option does not apply to this discussion.
Resale occurs where CLECs purchase the same
packages of services that the ILEC provides to its
own customers. 11 3 The CLEC then labels those

services under its own name.1 4 Resale, therefore,
provides little product differentiation in a competitive market.11 5 It is therefore deemed to be a
transitory measure to be used until interconnection via UNEs and facilities-based networks are
further developed.

16

Service providers who either cannot, or choose
not to provide services via their own network may
augment their service provision capacity by acquiring an ILEC's UNEs. 1 17 The CLEC either acquires all of its services on an unbundled basis, or
combines the ILEC's UNEs with its own.'1 8 The
CLEC must, however, present the mixture as one
package to a customer.' ' 9 While the end result
appears seamless in the customer's eyes, UNE service provision is complex, prone to errors, and
subject to ILEC discriminatory business practices
which are likely to affect the way an end-user perceives the CLEC's performance quality.1 20 As a result, a separate set of measurements are required
for UNEs.

See Local Competition Order, at 15509-15510.
113 See Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 1. Resellers
of local services merely "rebrand" the underlying carrier's
services with their own name, while facilities-based carriers
differentiate their services through quality of service provided via state-of-the-art technology, distinct and customized
service packages, and superb quality provided at the lowest
possible price. Id.
114 See id.
112

115

See id.

116

See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 28. "Re-

sale ...

is a limited interim vehicle to check the existing mo-

nopoly power of the LECs". Id.
117 See Local Competition Order, at 15509-15510.
118

See id.

See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98, at 8.
See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 29 (arguing
that the FCC should be aware that the UNE platform is still a
complete unknown given its inherent complexities).
121
Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 1. See also LCUG
Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62, app. A at 56. For
example, resale services requiring measurement include: resident POTS, Business POTS, Resident ISDN, Business ISDN,
Centrex/Centrex-Like, PBX trucks, Channelized T1.5 service, and other resold services. Id. UNE services requiring
measurement include: UNE platform, UNE channelized
119

120

The FCC must recognize the differences between UNEs and resale. 12 1 It should therefore establish separate measurement requirements for
the two services. It is also justified by the significant, future impact UNE's will have on the development of the local exchange.' 22 Lastly, measuring both will allow interested parties to determine
which is a more efficient path towards a CLEC's
future growth. This in turn results in a more competitive local exchange.

C.

Recommending What To Measure

The FCC must consider what ILECs will be required to measure. Generally, the purpose of performance measurements is to quantify the quality
and reliability of

OSS.123

Quality is measured by

time intervals which measure how long an activity
takes to complete.1 24 Reliability determines how
well the activity is performed, and if it needs to be
repeated.1

25

However,

performance

measure-

ments do not indicate the quality of OSS access.
Instead, they solely provide a yardstick to be used
in measuring against the pertinent service quality
1 26
benchmarks.

DS1, unbundled DSO loop, unbundled DS1 loop, other unbundled loops, unbundled switches, other UNEs. Id. Compare ALTS Service Quality Measurements, Version 1.0, app. A, at
28 (December 9, 1997), which adds the following items to
the LCUG list: ISDN basic rate, ISDN primary rate, unbundled DS3 loop, network interface device, direct inward dialing, remote call forwarding for ported numbers, signaling
system 7. See also Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 3.
ILECs should further be required to distinguish between analog and digital circuits, specifically because CLECs are more
likely to employ the greater-capacity-carrying digital loops in
an effort to distinguish its services. Id.
122
See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 29. The application of UNEs provide a middle ground between facilities-based competition and resale and provides a facilitated
path toward the former. Id.
See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
123
note 36, Friduss Aff. at 7.
124
See id. at 8. This can be an objective measurement
that measures the percentage of orders completed within a
certain time period, or it can be concrete and indicate the
number of minutes, hours, days, etc. needed to complete an
order. Id.
125 See id.
126
See id.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
1.

to orders.13 2 The third performance measure-

Pre-Order

The FCC should require ILECs to measure preordering for quality and reliability. Quality intervals may measure either the specific or average
time required for CLECs to obtain pre-order information.' 27 Time intervals will also allow a comparison to be made against the ILEC's OSS access
to show whether the CLEC has an equal opportunity to deliver a comparable customer experience. 128 Pre-order reliability will demonstrate the
"accuracy and completeness" of the data re129
ceived.
2.

Ordering and Provisioning

There are three measurement categories involved with ordering and provisioning. The average completion interval demonstrates the time required to deliver "integrated and operable service
components requested by the CLEC, regardless of
whether service resale or unbundled network elements are employed.'
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3°

1

The FCC ought also to

require an ILEC to measure the percentage of orders completed on time.1 3 ' Second, ordering and
provisioning reliability measurements determine
the "accuracy and completeness" of the response
127
See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 8. See also Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK,
supra note 36, Friduss Aff. at 12. Intervals demonstrate OSS
response times which allow a customer representative to
complete the order while on the phone with the customer.
Id. Cf Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that
pre-ordering measurements should determine if the ILEC
provides access within 20 seconds). Id.
128
See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 8.
129
See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff. at 12.
130
See ALTS: Service Quality Measurements, supra note 121,
at 13. See also Dept. ofJustice Evaluationof SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff., at 13. Average completion interval
measures response times for notification of order completion, jeopardy, and rejection. Id.
131 See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 8. Percent orders on time and average completion interval
may contribute to determining matters related to ILEC network capacity. Id.
132
See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff., at 13. See also LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62, at 9. Average response times may
also be used to indicate order status. Id. Additional status
measurements allow CLECs to determine: the average interval for order rejections; a firm order confirmation (FOC) to
indicate that an order has been completed; the average jeopardy interval to determine how long it took to transmit notice

ment relates to the percentage of orders that
"flow-through" from the CLEC service representative to completion where no ILEC technician in33
terrupts the order's path between interfaces.
3.

Maintenance & Repair

Performance quality measurements for maintenance and repair are key given their visibility to
the end-user.' 3 4 For example, a customer is likely
to have to cancel other obligations to be present
to receive a telephone service repairman. Any tardiness or missed service dates would therefore be
especially burdensome on the customer, who is
more likely to blame the CLEC who provides
him/her services than the underlying ILEC.
Quality of repair measures the interval between
when the end-user reports the need for repairs,
35
and the subsequent notification of completion.
Repair reliability measures the quality of the re36
pair by indicating the frequency of network.'
Other repair measurements that may be considered relate to whether repair commitments are
3 7
met according to the established benchmark. 1

that a FOC could not be processed as initially ordered by the
CLEC; the percent ofjeopardies returned; the average interval that an order is held beyond the promised order completion date. Id.
133
See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aft., at 13. See also Problems With OSS Interfaces
supra note 46, at 1. While BellSouth made improvements in
its flow-through rates, a 60% disparity of order flow-through
rates between ILEC and CLEC order was of particular concern to the FCC given that the services ordered were simple
resale orders. Id.
134 See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aft., at 14. Given end-user dependence on
communications services and the likelihood that they will
have to take time away from other daily chores to be at the
site where repairs are made, tardiness and frequent troubles
are especially troublesome. Id.
135 See id. at 15. See also LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62, at 10. There is a correlation between
time required to correct a service problem and customer dissatisfaction. Id.
136 See id. at 10 (noting that frequency of service repair
can also indicate the quality of the ILEC's network). Id. See
also Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 10 (adding that
other items to be measured may include the proportion of
time that an ILEC-installed facility requires repair within the
30 days of the last repair). Id.
137 See Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 10.
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ILECs must measure all unbundled loops 146 ob-

Billing Measurements

tained by each individual CLEC. 1 47 This there-

Billing performance measurements detail the
"speed, accuracy, and completeness" of ILEC-provided billing data.1 38 Quality measurements detail the average or specific time required to generate recorded usage records, and the average
time to deliver the invoices to the CLEC 1 39 Reliability of billing measures the percent of invoice

fore requires the ability to track all categories of

and usage accuracy. 140

7. Future Considerations

This is especially impor-

tant as inaccuracies result in incorrect charges being paid which result in damage to either the end141
user's bottom line, the CLEC's, or both.
5.

UNE-Specific Measurements

CLECs employ individual and combinations of
UNEs to provide competitive local exchange services. It is essential, therefore, that the ILEC-provided UNE function properly to ensure that
CLECs can combine network elements and pro14 2
vide a seamless array of services to end-users.
The only way to guaranty that capacity is through
monitoring of UNE access as provided by ILECs.

each unbundled loop for each carrier.

The

FCC ought also to require ILECs to differentiate
their reports by categories of services that carriers
149
provide and receive.

The obligation to measure all relevant OSS
services need not be permanent. The FCC may,
in the future, reward ILEC compliance with OSS
performance measuring and reporting requirements by tempering the obligation. In the case of
performance measurement requirements, the
FCC may reduce the number of services or methods by which they are measured. As discussed in
Section IV of this Comment, the frequency of
monthly reporting requirements may be reduced
as deemed appropriate.

D.
6. Recommendations

48

Creating Benchmarks for Performance
Measurement Standards

sponses to network errors which lead to service
1 45
degradation.

Benchmarks are the standard against performance measurements are compared to determine
if CLECs receive OSS access at the same level that
an ILEC provides to itself. As indicated below,
three parties may establish benchmarks: ILEC,
FCC, or PUC. The determination of whose
benchmarks are applied, however, essentially depends on whether the relevant ILEC provides reasonable standards against which its OSS provision
1 50
is to be measured.

See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
138
note 36, Friduss Aft., at 7.
See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
139
at 13. ILECs obtain an "artificial" competitive advantage
where they do not provide the records in a timely manner to
CLECs. Id.
140
See id.
See id.
141
142
See id. at 52.
143
See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 8. Other
unbundled network elements include white pages, E911, and
number portability. Id.
144
See id. See also id. at 9. Lack of parity in one of the
unbundled elements will likely hinder the appearance of the
CLEC's in the eyes of the end-user. Id.
See id. at 9.
145
146
See NEWrON's TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at

But the loop can also refer to the wires that connects the
ILEC's central office and the end-user's premises. Id.
147 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 10.
148 See id. This includes loop intervals, number portability, etc. See also ALTS: Service Quality Measurements, supra note
121, app. A, at 28. Additional services include: ISDN Basic
Rate; ISDN Primary Rate; Unbundled DS3 Loop; Network Interface Device; Direct Inward Dialing; Remote Call Forwarding for Ported Numbers; Signaling System 7; and interim
number portability. Id.
149 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 8. It is impractical for ILECs to assert that 90% of UNEs are provided
at nondiscriminatory intervals if half of the carriers with
which it interconnects do not access the same services. Id.
150 See Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp. to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 6 July 10, 1997).

678. A loop typically refers to a complete electrical circuit.

[hereinafter LCI Int'l Telecom Corp. Comments].

ILECs must measure all factors involved in making unbundled services appear seamless. UNE
performance measurement standards must therefore be measured and reported with the various
functions to which they are combined.1 43 For example, measurements must indicate the intervals
at which combined network elements are connected.1

44

ILECs must also measure timed re-
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1. ILECS May Provide Their Own Benchmarks
ILECs inability to provide their own 0SS performance measurement standards has been a primary reason for the initiation of the FCC's ongoing OSS rulemaking' 5' and 271 application
rejections.

52

The FCC nonetheless ought to rec-

ognize an ILEC's potential to further develop its
53
own standards for measuring access to OSS.'
15 4
Such standards must, however, be reasonable.

stead, the FCC's benchmark system must remain
flexible to accommodate persistent improvements
in OSS technology and marketplace pressures. 61
Benchmarks should also permit lapses in parity
due to environmental occurrences, labor strikes,
system

Where Not Provided By an ILEC, The FCC Will
Establish Default Standards
The FCC ought to establish its own benchmarks

where an ILEC does not provide its own.' 5 5 Such

standards would serve as default provision either
where the ILEC does not provide information or
its measurements

are inadequate.

56

Given a

PUC's role in arbitrating interconnection agreements,'

57

the FCC should recognize that its stan-

58
dards ought to reflect a minimal level of parity. 1
This in turn will provide states with an opportunity to fully adopt the FCC's standards, or enable
them to model their own OSS measurements stan59
dards.'
In establishing its default benchmarks, the FCC
should avoid developing numerically static, inflexible performance measurement standards.1 60 In151
See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 30. Not one
ILEC met the Section 251 interconnection obligation of providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions. Id.
152
See Dept. ofJustice Eval. of BellSouth LA, supra note 109,
at 31-32. DoJ examines whether BOC established performance standards demonstrate a BOC's commitments to meet
specified levels of performance and performance. In both its
Louisiana and South Carolina Section 271 applications BellSouth failed to provide sufficient performance measurements to make a determination of parity in the provision of
resale and UNEs. Id.
153
See Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note
150, at 6.

154

See id.

See id. Compare Comments of California Public Utilities Comm'n ("CPUC") to the Request for Comments in DA No.
97-1211, at 7 Jul. 9, 1997), with Comments of Nat'l
Telecomm. and Info. Admin. ("NTIA"), to the Request for
Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 2 (Aug. 12, 1997), and Comments of Wisconsin Public Service Comm'n, to the Request for
Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 5 (Jul. 9, 1997).
156
See Comments of LCl Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note 150,
155

at 6.
157
See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 2. The Act
mandates that both state and federal regulators oversee the
development of OSS functions. Id.
158
See id. at 7-8. Detailed standards would tax FCC re-

etc. 16 2

Moreover,

the FCC

should establish a biennial review of the
benchmarks to alter the system as necessary.

3.
2.

upgrades,

States May Establish Their Own Standards

Pursuant to Section 252(B) (4) (c), PUCs are responsible for arbitrating differences between interconnecting service providers.' 63 States therefore have a unique role in ensuring the
development of effective local competition. The
history of local service provision infers that PUCs
have a developed understanding of an ILEC's
methods of doing business, and their networks'
capacities. 164 State regulatory agencies should be
able to look at the FCC's default benchmarks and
determine whether or not more detailed standards are necessary. 1 65 If so, PUCs can thus determine which standards are most applicable to the
development of the local exchange in their juris66
diction.1
States must, however, recognize that imposing
benchmarks which are too strict will have a signifisources, and the notice and comment process might preclude states from initiating their own OSS rulemaking proceeding. Id.
159
See id.
160
See Comments of Teleport Comm. Group ("TCG") to
the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 2 (ul. 10,
1997). See also id. at 4. The Act and the FCC's interpretation
of it indicate that parity is a flexible standard that the FCC
should not try to set in stone. Id.
161 See id. Cf Comments of Wisconsin Public Service
Commission, to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211,
at 3 (Jul. 9, 1997) (arguing that standards ought to reflect the
fact that OSS "access has never been provided before and it is
literally impossible to create a defect-free information exchange system overnight"). Id.
162
See Comments of Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. to the Request for Comments in DA
No. 97-1211, at 9-10 (Jul. 9, 1997).
163 See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 6.
164
See Comments of NTIA, supra note 155, at 2.
165
See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 8. See also
Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note 150, at 6.
166
See Comments of NTIA, supra note 155, at 2. See also
Comments of Competitive Policy Institute ("CPI") to the Request foi Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 6 (Jul. 10, 1997).
States should be able to adopt OSS standards that are more
stringent than the FCC's. Id.
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cant adverse impact on local competition.1 6 7 Unreasonable standards will prevent BOCs from
demonstrating nondiscriminatory access to its
OSS functions.' 68 As a result, one state's unreasonable requirements will make it more difficult
for a BOC to obtain 271 licensing authority than
other states nationwide.1 69 The FCC should
therefore be attentive to this possibility and recognize the probability of preempting state authority
70
where it prevents local competition.
IV.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

In the Second Order on Reconsideration of the Local Competition Order, the FCC held that an ILEC
must provide an interconnecting CLEC the OSS
interface design specifications that it uses to provide OSS to itself.1 7 1 The FCC did not, however,
build on this reporting requirement, and thus left
open the issue of whether an ILEC would be required to report on its provision of access to OSS.
A.

The Purpose of Reporting Requirements: A
Need for Disclosure

ILECs are hesitant to disclose information regarding compliance with OSS nondiscriminatory
access standards. 7 2 Until the passage of the Act,
ILECs had a monopoly on local service. 173 With
the passage of the Act, the monopoly has been reduced to mere dominant market power.' 74 This
slide may forecast even greater market loss as local exchanges eventually become competitive. It
is therefore natural that an ILEC would want to
do whatever it can to maintain its place in the
market, prevent CLECs from taking its customers,
and also obtain authority to offer in-region in167

See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 8-9.

See id.
169
See Comments of CPI, supra note 166, at 5-6.
170
47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1998).
171
11 FCC Rcd. 19738, 19742 (1996).
172
See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support Systems Forum, at 36. Bell Atlantic required LCI to sign
168

a confidentiality order for all OSS performance standards. Id.
As a result, anything that LCI reported to a state utility com-

mission, Department of Justice, or the FCC would be under
seal and unavailable for the public's review. Id.
173

See id. at 72.

See id.
See id.
176
See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support Systems Forum, at 72.
177
See Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note
174
175

terLATA services. 1 7 5 If that means holding on to

reports measuring parity between services that an
ILEC offers to itself and the services that it pro1
vides to a CLEC, then so be it. 76
Reporting requirements serve as a monitoring
device to ensure compliance with ILEC measurement obligations.17 7

Moreover,

reporting

re-

quirements ensure that carriers, the FCC, PUCs
and other interested parties have access to the
same set of OSS access information. This in turn
will guaranty that they all "speak the same lan1 78
guage" with regard to performance standards.
Reporting requirements benefit both PUCs and
the FCC by providing an invaluable resource to
determine if nondiscriminatory access is being
provided. The agency may also use these reports
as a standard when reviewing petitions for mediation 1 7 9 or arbitration,18 0 or take corrective action
to remedy competitive problems disclosed by the
reports.18 1 Reports will also provide CLECs with
82
information basic to setting up its back-office'
monitoring systems to ensure that they are providing competitive local services. This information,
precludes a CLEC from collecting OSS access information from alternative sources which lack an
18
ILEC's first hand information.

3

Given the nature of a competitive industry, reports indicating discriminatory access will alert
CLECs that their customers are receiving inferior
services compared to what other carriers provide.
CLECs may then quickly identify problems, alert
the ILEC, and hopefully arrive at a concerted solution to the problem. If, however, such an ideal
resolution does not result, parties to the agreement can file complaints with administrative
agencies, either state18

4

or federal, 8

5

to resolve

the issue.
150, at 8.
See id.
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
Seeid. at § 252 (b)(1).
181 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, app. A at 13.
182
See IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6, § 1. The term
"back office" refers to where a company performs general
business functions, regardless of the communications service
provided general functionsthat a company requires, regardless of the business, are performed. Id. For example, a ILEC's
back office contain its entire OSS database. Id. Front office
refers to the part of the business that deals with customer
operations. Front office functions are frequently unique
based on the industry and/or service provided. Id.
183
See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 9.
184
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (West Supp. 1998). In general,
state regulatory agencies have authority over interconnection
178

179
180
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Reporting requirements are beneficial to ILECs
as they provide them with a record from which
they can advocate their own case for 271 authority, negotiate interconnection agreements, and
defend against complaints for lack of parity in
services. These reporting requirements will likely
pose a minimal burden on the ILEC.'8 6 0 SS already measure the ILEC's own services, and therefore should be able to provide the objective data
necessary to determine if parity is being provided
to a CLEC.'8 7 Even where reporting for specific
OSS services has been developed, OSS are large,
complex databases capable of performing such
added functions. 88

and future performance standards will be mea93
sured.'
Under this scheme the ILEC could optimally
provide any information specifically dealing with
manual OSS services. Such information would
demonstrate to all interested parties the negative
impact that manual OSS has on a CLEC's capacity
to enter the local exchange. This information
would also provide the ILEC the opportunity to
demonstrate its commitment to improving access
to OSS as it eventually replaces manual service
providers with electronic interfaces.

B.

Like interim reports, the FCC should require
ILECs to provide reports to the CLEC, FCC, PUC,
and ILEC itself on a monthly basis.' 9 4 The FCC
and relevant PUC should thereafter make the report available to the general public. This guarantees that everyone with a vested interest in the development of a competitive local exchange will
have the information necessary to monitor parity
for OSS. However, reports to CLECs should specify performance information for that carrier only,
but still report on other CLECs in a generalized,
9 5
non-descriptive manner.

Interim Reporting Requirements

Two years after the Act's passage, CLECs remain new entrants to the local exchange. Their
marketplace presence is hindered by ILEC unwillingness to disclose vital OSS information, 189 and
they lack alternative sources to get such information.' 9°1 Interim reporting requirements provide
CLECs an initial source of reference until reports
can be provided on a regular basis.' 9 1 Interim reports also facilitate future compliance monitoring
the FCC, PUCs, ILECs, and CLECs can refer to
them when circumstances require.

C.

1.
1. Recommendation for Interim Reporting
Requirement
The FCC should require ILECs to provide to
the FCC, PUCs, and CLECs with whom they interconnect an interim report describing: 1) all OSS
functions currently measured; 192 2) benchmarks
they adhere to; 3) performance measurement
standards being developed; 4) and, how current
agreements. Id.
185
See id. at § 252(e)(5). The FCC has authority over interconnection agreements where the PUC fails to act. Id.
186
See Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 16.
187
See id. Cf Opposition Comments of GTE Service
Corp., supra note 105, at 12-13.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 Cf Comments of AT&T Communications Corporation ("AT&T") to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211,
at 8 Uuly 10, 1997).
192
See id. at 19. See also Comments of WinStar, supra
note 59, at 3.
193
194

See id.

See In re Applications of NYNEX Corporation and Bell

Permanent Reporting Requirements

Time Framefor InitiatingMonthly Reporting
Requirements

A CLEC ought to begin receiving reports within
90 days after signing an interconnection agreement.19 6 After that, regular monthly reporting
ought to begin 197 which provides the CLEC with a
chart comparing the services it receives against: 1)
the OSS access that an ILEC's' 98 affiliate(s) receives; 2) the ILEC's ten largest retail customers;
Atlantic Corporation for Consent to transfer Control of
NYNEX Corp. and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 9 Comm. Reg. 187, Appendix C p. 257, (1997). [hereinafter Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger].
195
See CPUC R. 97-10-016, supra note 100, app. A. See also
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C at 257.
196
See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C
at 257. See also CPUC R.97-10-016, supra note 100, app. A.
197
See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C
at 257. See also Comments of AT&T, to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 20 (July 10, 1997). Compare with
Comments of TCG to the Request for Comments in DA No. 971211, at Exhibit A (Jul. 10, 1997). Given that some ILECs still
do not believe that OSS is a UNE, it may be inferred that
monthly reporting requirements are not favored. Id.
198 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194,
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3) carriers purchasing interconnection in the aggregate; 4) and, services and facilities provided to
individual carriers purchasing interconnection. 99
2. Recommendations for the Future
The FCC ought to consider building future
flexibility into the monthly reporting requirement.2 0 0 It may permit both the ILEC and CLEC

to build into their interconnection agreement a
relaxed reporting requirement that becomes effective after OSS parity standards have been met
over an extended period of time. Under this scenario the ILEC would submit to the FCC and PUC
a petition for relief from reporting requirements
based on a thorough demonstration that a proven
track record of compliance with OSS access requirements. The FCC would then issue a notice
of proposed rulemaking, and eventually issue a report.
Similarly, once an ILEC establishes a proven
track record of nondiscriminatory OSS access,
PUCs may permit relaxed reporting requirements
to be built into interconnection agreements. This
relaxation would likely appear as an contractual
option to go into effect once the ILEC proves
compliance over time. Or, it could be implemented according to the desires of the two contracting parties.
app. C at 257. While the FCC requires a report within 90
days after the signing of the agreement, it recognizes that reports for certain services may not be available by that time.
Id. See also CPUC R.97-10-016, supra note 100, app. A.
19 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C
at 257. Compare Comments of TCG, supra note 160, at Exhibit 1.
200
See id.
201
See In re Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194,
App. C at 257. Id.
202
Id. But see Comments of Wisconsin Public Service Commission, supra note 155, at 3. Wisconsin does not believe a long
list is necessary, instead just proof that an ILECs intervals are
the same as the CLEC's. Id.
203
See In re Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194,
app. C, at 257. However, a PUC may require more information for its review of an application to obtain section 271 licensing authority, but may not require less than the FCC default for any other matter including monthly monitoring
reports. Id.
204
See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (West Supp. 1998). But see Application of Ameritech MI, supra note 47, at 330. Carriers require
a great deal of information for their monitoring of parity in
OSS services. Id. Therefore, it is unlikely that a carrier would
initially want less information, but instead require more. Id.
Compare Comments of AT&T, supra note 191, to the Request
for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 20 (Jul. 10, 1997). As local competition becomes firmly rooted, carriers, like the

D.

Recommendations for the Content of the
Reports

The FCC should establish a default reporting
regulation requiring ILECs to provide a detailed
narration of all the numeric measurements within
the report. 20 1 The report should also include descriptive information defining which OSS services
are measured. 20 2 Under this scenario, the ILEC
20 3
should be required to provide any information
that a PUC requires in addition to what is mandated by the FCC. Additionally, under Section
252, the PUC may allow carriers to contract between themselves to provide greater or lesser
20 4
amounts of information.
E.

Reports Not Required on a Regular Basis

Given that ILECs' OSS are often designedto
their specific service requirements, 20 5 and the fact
that OSS are largely not subject to nationwide
technological standards, 20 6 CLECs are forced to
figure out how to interconnect with OSS that are
distinct from others with which they interconnect.2 0

7

This often occurs on a service by service

208
basis, and also from state to state.

FCC, are likely to reduce their demands for information detailing service intervals and concentrate on more appropriate
competitive concerns. Id.
205
See IEC Web Proforums,supra note 6, § 1. OSS were developed to accommodate the past static network configurations of "one line, one number, hard wired, not many
changes." Id.
206
See Comments of WinStar, supra note 99, at 3 (noting
that "[o]f particular concern to Winstar is the fact that each
ILEC's OSS functions are not standardized"). Id. Cf Comments of GST Telecom, Inc. to the Requestfor Comments in DA
No. 97-1211, at 12 (uly 10, 1997)( arguing that "[u]ntil
standardization is achieved, the Commission cannot establish
minimum national standards for the provision of access to
OSS by ILECs"). Id. See also Common CarrierBureau Operations
Support Systems Forum, supra note 22 at 60. (asserting that we
absolutely need technical standards). Id. Note, this Comment
does not address the issue of standards, as it is a subject unto
itself.
207
IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6, at § 3. Today, traditional carriers must deal with "hundred of non or semi-integrated systems, legacy core applications, and the demands of
the new competitive marketplace to provide competitive differentiation through service delivery." Id.
208
Id. While service providers have similar core systems
to provide pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing, "literally thousands of applications have developed within each provider to customize core

COMNMLAW CONSPECTUS
1.

Recommendations

The FCC must recognize the lack of technological uniformity and require that ILECs report any
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veloped, alterations to those systems must be expected. A CLEC ought to apprised of any such
changes.

information related to their OSS hardware and
software configurations. 20

9

ILECs should be re-

quired to inform CLECs of any internal "business
rules,"2 10 especially information related to ordering codes and field

identifiers. 2 11

CLECs require

information describing the codes to ensure that
service initiation is not delayed due to a faulty or212
dering process.
The most appropriate FCC requirement would
place an affirmative obligation on an ILEC to provide to CLECs its "business rules concerning how
its internal systems and databases process an order."2 1 3 Competition and technological advances
will likely further develop OSS capacity. 2 14 Any
such developments will likely affect any CLEC's
use of the systems. 215 The FCC should require
ILECs to report any and all alterations or developments to its business rules. This will ensure the
CLEC's ability to enter orders with the most up-todate codes, which will thereby preclude any possi-

bility of rejection resulting from ignorance.
In a similar manner, the FCC should require
ILECs to inform the CLEC of any changes made
to its hardware configurations. This argument as-

sumes that all interested parties will be informed
of industry standards. While standards may be deOSS and support new services." Id.
209
See Application of BellSouth South Carolina, supra note
84, at para. 114. High ordering error rates can be attributed,
to BellSouth's failure in "providing competing carriers with

information and support concerning the effective use of the
EDI interface."
210
See Application of Ameritech MI, supra note 47, at 310311. "Business rules" refer to protocols used by ILECs to
guaranty that orders are formatted in a uniform manner. Id.
An example would be a hardware command that prohibits
the resubmission of an order after it was initially rejected. Id.
211
See Dept. ofJusticeEvaluation of Ameritech MA, supra note
33, App. A at 24. Universal service ordering codes ("USOCs")
and field identifiers ("FID") are the codes used by an ILEC to
identify services and features. Id. The codes subsequently appear on the customer service records that the ILEC provides
CLECs. Id. If a CLEC "cannot accurately identify the corresponding services and features a customer currently receives,
the CLEC may not be fully aware of service-affecting ramifications of assuming service obligations for the customer or be
able to order services accurately." Id. See also In re Common
CarrierBureau Operations Support Systems Forum, supra note 22
at 69-70. USOCs are difficult to interpret, as they are strings
of letters, which if you enter into the OSS interface incorrectly, even by one letter, the order is rejected. Id. See also In
re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support Systems Forum, at 70. USOCs differ for residential and business con-

V.

PENALTIES

Unless properly set penalty provisions are established, OSS reporting and performance standards
will not provide ILECs with an incentive to comply with Sections 251 and 271. As noted in Section 11(d) of this Comment, the FCC retains ample jurisdiction upon which to penalize ILECs for
not providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS
functions.2 16 Three alternatives exist for the FCC
to implement this policy: 1) abstain from regulating and allow penalties to be determined by interconnection agreements; 2) monetary penalties; 3)
injunctive penalties.
A.

Abstention

The least active FCC policy would impose penalties through carriers' interconnection agreements. There are two reasons why this option is
.not viable. First, contractual negotiations have
not proved themselves to be an effective deterrence to discriminatory OSS access.2 1 7 Second,
ILECs retain market power that precludes any
2 18
sort of effective contractual, monetary penalty.
sumers, further compounding the difficult situation already
faced by CLECs. Id.
212
See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of Ameritech MI, supra note
33, at 310-311. See also, Application for BellSouth SC, supra note
84, at para. 111 "we find that the evidence reasonably supports a conclusion that some of the competing carriers' errors were caused by Bell South's failure to provide business
rule and other pertinent information." Id.
213
Applicationfor BellSouth SC, supra note 84, at para. 111.
214
See also In re Common CarrierBureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, supra note 22, at 58. Technology and consumer demands will change over time and, as a result, there
will be a ongoing process through which OSS problems are
solved. Id.
215
See id.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 201-204.
217
See Comments of AT&T, supra note 191 at 25. "Contractual remedies are usually based on a percentage of the
ILEC's charges for specific network elements or services or
related support functions, and are too low to provide an effective incentive for the ILECs to act in a nondiscriminatory
manner." Id.
218 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support Systems Forum, at 72. The local exchange as it currently
exists does not resemble a normal commercial setting, instead it is comprised of a monopoly powerhouse and a collection of smaller players. Id.
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If abstention were an effective approach, interconnection negotiations would provide CLECs
with nondiscriminatory access to OSS. However,
given the established need for performance measurements, benchmarks, and reporting require2 19
ments, this is not the case.
B.

Monetary Penalties
Over time, the FCC's capacity to impose mone-

tary penalties against ILECs 220 has not been an

overly effective regulatory tool. As noted above,
powerful ILECs are not as likely to be financially
devastated by a financial penalty as would a CLEC.
Indeed, past experiences prove that fines and forfeitures are institutionally difficult for the FCC to
assess and only moderately deter non-competitive
2 21
ILEC behavior.
1. Recommendation for Monetary Penalties
Should the FCC decide to impose fines, however, it should create self-executing sanctions
based on an ILEC's reports. 22 2 This approach
may be bolstered by establishing additional fines
for multiple or repeated failures. The FCC
should also apply this approach against ILECs for
223
submitting false or misleading data.

C.

Injunctive Penalties

The FCC's authority under Section
271(d) (6)(iii) permits it to suspend or revoke a
carrier's authority to offer in-region interLATA
services. 224 While the scope of this authority is
daunting, requiring a carrier to stop providing interLATA service to its customers would be an extreme measure. 225 For example, human resources devoted to planning, marketing, and
administering an ILEC's in-region, interLATA
219
See Comments of ALTS, to the Request for Comments in
DA No. 97-1211, at ii. The only local competition will materialize is by establishing performance measurements, performance standards, and remedies. Compare Comments of GTE, to
the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 6-7 (July 10,
1997). -ILECs are contractually obligated to meet intercon-

nection standards, and if not are liable for substantial monetary damages. Id.

220
See 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1994). See generally 47 U.S.C.
§ 501-503 (1994).
221
See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98 at 16.
222
See Comments of AT&T, supra note 191 at 26.
223
See id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994). FCC is authorized to levy against common carriers fines of up to

program would be susceptible to FCC injunctive
authority.
1. Recommendation
Less intense measures exist. The FCC may allow the penalized ILEC to continue providing service to customers that are already signed up and
receiving service, but remove an ILEC's authority
226
to accept new orders for interLATA service.
The FCC may impose fines for initial violations,
but then implement a sliding scale of fines and
injunctive relief with repeated violations. For example, discriminatory OSS access over a two
month period may only result in fines.

If such problems persist, however, the fines may
increase in quantity, and eventually may be combined with less restrictive injunctive relief, like
halting the signing up of new customers. Should
the problem continue, more stringent injunctions
may be imposed. Where discrimination is endemic, 271 authority should eventually be rescinded .227
CONCLUSION:
Before and during the reign of the Modified FinalJudgment, little was heard about the potential
for competition in the local exchange. The rapid
expansion of the market for long distance services
demonstrated just how profitable competition can
be for carriers and consumers alike. With the passage of time, the local exchange became seen as
the next untapped source for a boom in telecommunications. The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 broke down the monopolistic local services market and intended to open it up to
competition.
The Act essentially removed the barriers to en$100,000 per day for "willfully or repeatedly" violate the Act
or other relevant regulations. Id.
224
See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (6) (iii) (West Supp. 1998). See
also 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1994). See also 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)
(1994). Allowing the FCC to enjoin non-BOCs from regulated activities. Id.
225
See Comments of CPI, supra note 166, at 5-6. It is not
in the public interest to require the BOC to cease providing
interLATA services once it has obtained customers. Id.
226
See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98, at 16. See
Comments of CPI, supra note 160, at 12. Another reasonable

injunctive measure would be stopping the specific BOC from
marketing interLATA services to new customers. Id.
227

See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98, at 16.
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try into the local telecommunications markets. 228
Since then $14 billion has been invested in
CLECs, 2400 interconnection agreements have
been signed, and the combined local exchange
229
market is now valued at over $20 billion dollars.
However, that does not mean that local competition is as profitable or ubiquitous as it should be.
OSS remains one major reason why local competition has not fully bloomed. ILECs are required by the Act to provide nondiscriminatory
access to their OSS. Unfortunately, because of
network design and anti-competitive business
practices, CLECs have yet to gain the access they
require to compete effectively.
Discriminatory OSS access is hindering CLECs
ability to compete in the local exchange. CLECs
cannot access customer service records to perform the pre-ordering necessary to market services to customers. There are debilitating delays
involved with obtaining ILEC responses to CLEC
service orders. Even where services are properly
ordered, ILEC-supplied manual and automated
OSS substantially delay the provisioning process.
ILECs are also guilty of not attending to CLEC requests for network maintenance as quickly as they
do for their own services. Nor are CLECs receiving accurate billing records in a timely fashion.
228
Press Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard on the
Second Anniversary of the Telecom Act of 1996 (Jan. 30, 1998)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/
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The FCC must become involved in resolving
these problems. It must require ILECs to measure all OSS services for resale and UNEs. It must
also provide a reasonable set of default
benchmarks against which ILEC performance
measurements are compared. Secondly, the FCC
must require interim and then monthly reporting
requirements for monitoring ILEC compliance
with OSS service obligations. Lastly, where ILEC
compliance is not provided, the FCC must penalize ILECs via a combination of monetary and injunctive relief.
The local exchange is not the only sector of the
communications industry experiencing massive
growth. Satellite deregulation, the implementation of the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services,
wireless, and Direct Broadcast Satellite are all major reasons for the communications industry's
outstanding growth. The FCC should continue to
seize upon this pro-competitive tendency and ensure that CLECs have the nondiscriminatory OSS
access they need to successfully provide competitive local services.

stwek804.htrml>.
29

See id.

